Abstract-In this paper we study the resilience of a continuous LTI system which is controlled remotely via a wireless channel. An energy-constrained periodic (partially known) jammer is corrupting the control communication channel by imposing Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. We derive a triggering time-sequence, addressing when to update the control signal under the assumption that the period of the jammer has been detected. Then, we show that, under some sufficient condition, this triggering time-sequence counteracts the effect of the jammer and assures asymptotic stability of the plant. We prove our results theoretically, and demonstrate their validity in a simulation example.
The topic of security in cyber-physical systems is receiving wide attention from the controls community and has been studied from different viewpoints in the last years. In the framework of multiagent systems, we refer the reader to [21] , [16] , [17] . In these papers, the main problem is the identification of the malicious agent, who is part of the network, and the cancellation of its contribution. In [6] and [5] , identification is not the main issue, and the specific objective is how to maintain connectivity of the network, despite the presence of the malicious agents. In [27] , the authors develop an attack-resilient method subject to deceptive attacks. Our problem formulation is related to the cited previous work in the sense that we assume the jammer has been detected and we propose an algorithm that aims to counteract its effect.
Other references in the context of secure discrete LTI systems are [10] , [3] . In [10] , the authors consider deceptive attacks where deception occurs in the observation channel. In [3] , the attack is DoS, the problem is formulated in a stochastic setup,and moreover, the attacker obeys an Identically Independent Distributed (IID) assumption, similar to [20] .
The references [2] , [12] , [23] , and [19] model the security problem as a (dynamic) zero-sum non-cooperative game, so they can predict the behavior of the attacker. The authors in [2] , [23] , and [19] study the vulnerability of the network towards deceptive attacks which differs from our problem. The closest reference to our work is [12] , which studies a similar problem in a gametheoretic framework. However, a main limitation of [12] is the restriction to scalar dynamics. As usually done in Game Theory, a specific cost function modeling the attacker is assumed, in addition to her omniscient capabilities.
Another important topic when it comes to cyberphysical systems, is that of achieving desired control goals with economic communications. This has motivated the topic of triggering control, i.e., control actions triggered only when it is necessary. One can distinguish between related self-triggered control and eventtriggered control; see [22] , [15] and [25] , which study LTI systems. The technique used in [25] is based on Input-Output stability analysis, whereas, the technique [22] and [15] is based on Input-to-State Stability (ISS) Lyapunov concept, which also inspires this work. However, a main distinguishing feature is the fact that communications may not be always feasible in our formulation.
In this paper, we address the problem of system resilience in the context of event-triggering control. The types of attacks considered are DoS attacks which we assume have been partially identified. Other than this, we consider a generic class of continuous LTI systems and a generic class of PWM jammers. In particular, we propose a novel triggering time-sequence to counteract jammer effects and derive a sufficient condition under which the asymptotic stability is ensured, i.e., the system is safe and secure.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we state, both formally and informally, the main problem analyzed in the paper.
We consider a remote operator-plant setup, where the operator uses a control channel to send wirelessly a control command to an unstable plant, see Figure 1 . We assume that the plant has no specific intelligence and is only capable of updating the control based on the data it receives. We also assume that the operator knows the plant dynamics and is able to measure its states continuously. 1 In this paper, we assume that the type of jammer and the period of the jamming signal has been identified. Future work will be devoted to enlarge the triggering time-sequence for identification purposes.
Let x ∈ R n be the state vector and u ∈ R m be the input vector. We consider the following dynamics:
where A, B and K are matrices of proper dimensions, and {t k } k≥1 is the triggering time-sequence to be defined later. We denote e(t)
We consider an energy-constrained, periodic jammer whose signal can be represented as follows:
where n ∈ N is the period number, T ∈ R >0 , and T = [0, T ] is the action-period of the jammer. Also, T off ∈ R >0 , T off < T , and T off = [0, T off ] is the time-period where it is sleeping, so communication is possible. We further denote T on ∈ R >0 , and T on = [T on , T ] to be the time-period where the jammer is active, thus no data can be sent. Accordingly, it holds that T off + T on = T . We also note that the parameter T off need not be timeinvariant which recalls Pulse-Width Modulated (PWM) jamming. Finally, we denote by T cr off a uniform lowerbound for T off , i.e., T cr off ≤ T off which we assume holds for all the periods and we have identified as well.
Putting these pieces together, we study the following problem:
[Problem formulation]: Knowing T and T cr off ≤ T off , uniformly for all the periods, determine an event-triggering strategy for the operator that is sufficient for system stabilization despite the presence of the jammer.
III. ATTACK-RESILIENT EVENT-TRIGGERED STRATEGY
In this section, we introduce an event-triggered strategy which is resilient towards the jamming attack. To do so, we make use of the ISS approach of [22] and [15] .
Here, we assume that: (i) the system (1a) is open-loop unstable, and (ii) the pair (A, B) is controllable. The latter guarantees that there exists matrix K such that A + BK is Hurwitz. This implies that for every matrix Q = Q T ≻ 0, there exists a unique matrix P = P T ≻ 0 such that the Lyapunov equation:
holds [13] . Given Q, we consider the Lyapunov func-
T P x(t), so interchangeably, we shall use V (x) or V (t). Since Q and P are symmetric, positive-definite matrices, then by applying the Cholesky decomposition, we can express them as Q = L T L and P = U T U , for some L, U ∈ R n×n . We also denote by . and |.|, the Euclidean matrix and vector norms, respectively.
We introduce our ISS-Lyapunov function in the following result.
Proposition 3.1:
Consider the system (1), where (3) holds. Let V (x) = x T P x be the Lyapunov function. If Q > 1, then the following holds:
where θ 1 , θ 2 ∈ R >0 . In other words, V is an ISSLyapunov function for (1).
Proof: Due to space limits, we omit the complete proof. It uses completion of squares bound, and the Cholesky decomposition.
Similar to [22] , one can use the ISS-Lyapunov function of Proposition 3.1, together with a design parameter σ ∈ (0, 1), to determine a stabilizing event-triggering law when the jammer is absent: Proposition 3.2: Consider the system (1a), along with the Lyapunov function V (x) = x T P x associated with Q > 1. If the control (1b) is updated at times t k governed by the following triggering law:
then the system is asymptotically stable.
Proof: Due to space limits, we omit the complete proof. It is based on imposingV (x) < 0 on (5).
In what follows, we shall study the asymptotic stability of the system despite jammer presence under a simple modification of the above triggering law. In what follows, we assume that the jammer is imposing a "worstcase jamming scenario", i.e., T off = T cr off . Definition 3.3: We define the triggering time-sequence despite jammer presence as follows:
∀k ∈ N, ∀n ∈ N. In (7), k denotes the number of triggering times occurring in n th jammer action-period.
In order to interpret the triggering law (7), let us consider the n th action-period, i.e., t ∈ [(n − 1)T, nT ]; Then, we shall take the time-instants given by (6) which also lie in the (n − 1)T, (n − 1)T + T cr off time-period along with nT . In this way, if ever it happens that:
then the only triggering instant would be nT .
Remark 3.4:
In the triggering law (7), the following holds:
This is based on Theorem III.1, presented in [22] . In other words, the time-sequence generated by the triggering law (7) does not accumulate. This is an important observation used in our analysis.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED TRIGGERING LAW
Having introduced the triggering law (7), we present our main result in this section which studies the asymptotic stability of the system under attack.
In [14] , the author proves the following bound for a matrix M ∈ R n×n :
where the µ-operator is defined as follows:
We shall exploit this bound in the proof of our main result.
Theorem 4.1:
Consider the system (1), along with the triggering law (7). The system is asymptotically stable if the following conditions are satisfied:
where,
and, µ(A + BK) < 0 .
Proof: We shall focus on the first jammer actionperiod, i.e., 0 ≤ t ≤ T . We then show that under the proposed sufficient condition, it holds that V (T ) < ΥV (0), for some Υ ∈ (0, 1), which can be inductively extended to show V ((n + 1)T ) < ΥV (nT ), ∀n ∈ N. From here we then demonstrate that asymptotic stability can be guaranteed. For the sake of brevity, we drop n = 1 in the t * k,n annotation. Without loss of generality, let {t * 1 = 0, t * 2 , t * 3 , . . . , t * m } be the timesequence generated by the triggering law (7), where it holds that t * m ≤ T cr off and t * m+1 > T cr off . We note that there must exist such an m > 0, since according to Remark 3.4, this time-sequence does not accumulate.
We consider the evolution of the Lyapunov function in the time-interval t * i , t * i+1 , where 0 ≤ t * i , t * i+1 ≤ t * m . According to (7) , in this interval, equation (6) is not yet violated, hence the following holds:
Upper-bounding (5), the latter equation yields:
Now, we note that:
with which we can further upper-bound equation (12) as follows:
By applying the comparison principle on (13), we get:
. Using (14) in an inductive way, we can express the evolution of Lyapunov function for the time-interval [0, t * m ], as follows:
where we used the fact that t *
. At this stage, note that, according to the triggering law (7), the control cannot be updated within the timeinterval [t * m , T ]. As discussed in Claim 4.3, a sufficient condition for asymptotic stability is given by V (T ) < ΥV (0), with Υ ∈ (0, 1). To see why this holds, we firstly develop an estimate for x (T ).
We recall the dynamics (1), which given the above explanations and notations, can be written under either:
or:
form. Let us consider (17) , whose explicit solution evaluated at t = T is given by:
By applying the triangular-inequality, equation (8), and sup-operator on (18), we get:
We can solve the integral term in (19) which gives the following bound:
In order to further progress in our analysis, we need to find an appropriate bound for sup s∈[t * m ,T ] |e(s)|. This is done in the following claim. 
Proof of Claim 4.2: Due to space limits, we omit the complete proof.
• Now, we plug (21) into (20) which then by some simplifications yields:
where the parameter α ′ is defined as follows:
It is worth to note that comparing the parameters α and α ′ , introduced in (10) and (23), respectively, it holds that α ′ ≤ α, which is because t * m ≤ T cr off and µ(A + BK) < 0, by assumption. According to this observation, equation (22) can be written as:
The value of the Lyapunov function at t = T , can be estimated as follows:
which then according to (24) , can be further bounded:
Besides, let us define the parameter γ to be:
where we note that γ < 0, based on the assumption of this theorem. Then, we can rewrite (15) as in:
We note that as γ < 0 and t * m ≤ T cr off , we obtain that exp (γT cr off )V (0) ≤ exp (γt * m )V (0), based on this inequality, we can impose the following bound on (28):
Now, along the same reasoning for (25), we note that
A conservative bound can be imposed as follows:
Applying bound (30) on (26), we obtain:
Let Υ α 2 exp (γT cr off ), we note that Υ > 0, to wrap this proof, we shall state the next result.
Claim 4.3:
In (31), imposing Υ ∈ (0, 1) guarantees the asymptotic stability, i.e., lim n→∞ x(nT ) = 0.
Proof of Claim 4.3:
Due to space limits, we omit the complete proof.
• Therefore, according to Claim 4.3, a sufficient condition for maintaining the asymptotic stability is given in the following:
Now, we recall the definition of parameter γ, presented in (27) , and that Υ > 0, by its construction. Also, we note that U 2 = P , plus given that exp is a monotonically increasing function, we can rewrite (32) in the form of (9) . This, hence, completes the proof.
Remark 4.4:
The result provided in the Theorem 4.1 can be interpreted as a feasibility statement. In other words, for a given system in the form (1), one has to find the proper design parameters K, P , Q, and σ ∈ (0, 1) such that the following constraints are satisfied:
We note that, e.g., if T cr off = T , i.e., the jammer is not malicious at all, then α = 1 and so the constraint (33c) holds for free. The same will be true for T cr off ≈ T . Additionally, note that more relaxed sufficient conditions for stability can be obtained by imposing V (knT ) ≤ ΥV ((n − 1)T ) for some fixed k > 1, some Υ ∈ (0, 1), and all n ∈ N.
V. SIMULATION
In Section III, we have developed a triggering timesequence and in Section IV proved that under some sufficient conditions, the system under attack is asymptotically stable. In this section, we shall show the validity of these theoretical results on an academic example.
Let us consider the following system:
where u ∈ R. We note that, for this system, (A, B) is a controllable pair. In addition, it is an open-loop unstable system, provided that eigenvalues of A have positive real-part. We pick the control gain:
which renders the matrix A + BK Hurwitz. Then, we consider the matrix:
We note that Q = Q T ≻ 0, and that Q > 1. Given these matrices, Lyapunov equation (3) gives us:
We consider the jammer, imposing signal u jmd (t), where T = 2 and T cr off = 1.8. We then refer to the Theorem 4.1. One can compute that: α = 1.4413, P = 1.2343 and Q = 1.559. Thus, the condition (9) would be translated into:
It infers that the allowable range for the design parameter is σ ∈ (0, 0.1041). To realize, at this point, all the assumptions of this theorem are satisfied, therefore, we expect that the triggering time-sequence (7) render the system asymptotically stable.
The temporal evolution of the states is shown in Figure 2 . We can see that the control policy, along with triggering time-sequence has counteracted the effect of jamming attacks.
In order to further demonstrate the triggering timesequence, we have drawn the temporal evolution of |e(t)| 2 and Figure 3 . For the sake of clarity, we have zoomed on the first four periods. According to this figure, we note, e.g., that in the timeinterval t ∈ T cr off , T , where the communication is not feasible, the error grows in an unbounded fashion. This effect, however, is accounted for in the next period by triggering more often.
The other interesting observation out of our simulation is explained here. While preserving matrices P and Q, for T cr off ≤ 1.7996, there is no feasible σ. This is to note that for these more malicious attackers, we cannot have a feasible controller. A solution would be to tune matrices P and Q which has not been studied in this simulation.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have considered a plant-jammer-operator setup, where the control communication channel (from the operator to the plant) is corrupted by a periodic jammer. For the benefit of maintaining less communication, we have adopted an event-triggering time-sequence to restrict communications when necessary. We have then shown, theoretically and in simulation, that this triggering time-sequence is capable of counteracting the jammer attack and also rendering the system asymptotically stable under some conditions. As is explained in the manuscript, we assume the jammer has been identified to the extent that it is periodic and its characteristic parameters are known by the operator. We are currently working on extending our triggering strategy on two fronts: (i) allow for more events so that learning and identification of the jammer is possible, and (ii) exploiting the controllability properties of the linear system to beat a wider class of periodic jammers. In the future we would like to consider more malicious jammer classes.
